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Protest Responses and Willingness to Accept: Ecosystem Services 
Providers’ Preferences towards Incentive-Based Schemes 
Anastasio J. Villanueva, Klaus Glenk and Macario Rodríguez-Entrena1 
ABSTRACT. The identification and treatment of protest responses in stated preference surveys 
has long been subject to debate. We analyse protest responses while investigating ecosystem 
services providers’ preferences for incentive-based schemes. We use a choice experiment for 
olive farmers’ preferences for agri-environmental scheme participation in southern Spain. Our 
two main objectives are: first, to identify and discuss a range of possible motives for protest 
responses that emerge in a WTA context; second, we analyse the impact on WTA estimates of 
censoring serial non-participation linked to protest or high compensation requirements (very 
high takers). Using a random parameter logit model in WTA space, we find that the inclusion or 
exclusion of serial non-participants in the analysis can have a significant impact on marginal 
and total WTA estimates. Based on the findings, the paper makes recommendations on how to 
reduce the incidence of protest responses through survey design, regarding the identification 
of protesters as opposed to very high takers, and regarding the treatment of both groups of 
respondents for WTA estimation. 
KEYWORDS: Protest response; Willingness to accept; Payments for ecosystem services; Agri-
environmental schemes; Choice experiment; Olive farmers; Spain 
JEL classifications: Q18, Q58. 
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1. Introduction 
It is well-known that some respondents to stated preference surveys do not engage in the 
hypothetical market to reveal their preferences (Halstead et al., 1992). Commonly, these 
people are considered to be ‘protesters’ since they reject (protest against) aspects of the 
constructed market scenario (Meyerhoff et al., 2014). However, it is challenging to clearly 
distinguish between responses that reflect protest motives and responses that actually reflect 
respondents’ preferences (Meyerhoff and Liebe, 2006; Meyerhoff et al., 2012). In willingness 
to pay (WTP) contexts, the issue is demonstrated by the difficulty of differentiating protest 
responses from true or ‘genuine’ zero responses (Barrio and Loureiro, 2013). Correctly 
identifying protest responses matters, because their inclusion or omission in the analysis can 
affect welfare estimates (Halstead et al., 1992; Strazzera et al., 2003).  
The identification and subsequent treatment of protest responses has received much 
attention in the stated preference literature (Strazzera et al., 2003; Dziegielewska and 
Mendelsohn, 2007; Meyerhoff and Liebe, 2006, 2010; Barrio and Loureiro, 2013; Söderberg 
and Barton, 2014). However, all of these studies concern consumers’ WTP for changes in the 
provision of environmental goods and services. The issue of protest responses has, to the best 
of our knowledge, not yet been systematically investigated in the context of willingness to 
accept (WTA), although an increasing number of studies analyse preferences of ecosystem 
service (ES) providers towards incentive-based schemes (Horne, 2006; Layton and Siikamäki, 
2009; Espinosa-Goded et al., 2010; Christensen et al., 2011; Barr and Mourato, 2014; Peterson 
et al., 2015). These studies usually estimate WTA of ES providers for enrolment in incentive-
based schemes, with the underlying assumption being that providers’ choices about 
participation depend on the specific scheme characteristics. In the past decade, choice 
experiments (CE), and to a lesser extent contingent valuation approaches (CV), have been 
extensively applied in the context of agri-environmental schemes (AES) in Europe (Horne, 
2006; Espinosa-Goded et al., 2010; Christensen et al., 2011; Broch and Vedel, 2012; Beharry-
Borg et al., 2013), and payments for ecosystem services schemes (PES) in the United States 
(Cooper, 1997; Matta et al., 2009; Peterson et al., 2015), and other parts of the World (Barr 
and Mourato, 2014; Mulatu et al., 2014).  
Few WTA studies investigating incentive-based schemes consider protest responses, 
and even then the constitution of protest responses is seldom if ever analysed systematically, 
applying different criteria for identifying protest patterns. As a consequence, the current 
literature does not provide any coherent guidance on identifying protest responses in WTA 
contexts. To our knowledge, there is also no empirical evidence of the impact of protest 
responses on ES providers’ WTA for contract attributes of incentive-based schemes. We aim to 
provide insights into both the identification and analysis of protest responses in WTA 
assessments. 
We investigate possible reasons for protest behaviour and propose effective means of 
identifying them in WTA studies related to incentive-based scheme design. We use data from a 
case study on olive growers’ preferences towards AES design in Andalusia (southern Spain) 
(Villanueva et al., 2015) to analyse the impact of inclusion or omission of protest responses on 
WTA. We use a random parameter logit model in WTA space, and also use a sample selection 
bivariate probit model to investigate factors determining serial non-participation. 
2. Characterising non-participation decisions of ecosystem services providers: 
protest and very high taking 
While the identification of protest responses in WTP formats typically consists of distinguishing 
protest bids from ‘true’ zero bids (Barrio and Loureiro, 2013; Söderberg and Barton, 2014), 
protest in WTA is mainly concerned with distinguishing protest behaviour from ‘very high 
taking’ (Ferreira and Gallagher, 2010). Very high takers (VHT) are respondents whose WTA for 
the good on offer exceeds the highest bid level offered in closed-ended contingent valuation 
formats, or the highest compensation level offered in any alternative of a CE. In the context of 
CE aimed at assessing land managers’ participation in incentive-based schemes, serial non-
participation (choosing the opt-out or status quo alternative in all choice tasks of a CE) 
therefore reflects either an aversion to making trade-offs in general (protest) or very high 
compensation requirements (VHT). 
Land managers are typically the focus for stated preference studies assessing ES 
providers’ WTA for participating in incentive-based schemes. Assuming rational behaviour, a 
land manager chooses to participate in a scheme if the expected benefits of doing so outweigh 
the costs.  
Apart from the compensation offered, benefits include expectations regarding a 
scheme’s short term or long term impact on production efficiency, and also may reflect 
individual satisfaction from contributions to environmental quality. Potential aspects that 
affect expectations on costs include transaction costs associated with participation, or 
management costs associated with technology change (Pannell, 2008), as well as the 
opportunity costs of participation. Further, farmers’ risk attitude may affect how costs and 
benefits are perceived and therefore influence their decision to participate (Schilizzi and 
Latacz-Lohmann, 2016). Incentive-based scheme alternatives for inclusion in stated preference 
studies directly control for benefits derived from compensation payments. Apart from that, 
scheme alternatives may be designed in a way that entail transaction costs (e.g. reporting 
requirements), allowing the researcher to observe elements of transaction costs over and 
above those incurred from participation in general. Choice of management prescriptions may 
affect transaction costs and also influence perceived benefits in terms of productivity or 
environmental performance. However, it is difficult to isolate these effects through the 
experimental design of the study. Actual costs (especially opportunity costs) and benefits of 
the farmer therefore often remain unobserved. 
So long as the compensation payment is sufficiently high, all rational land managers 
would be expected to participate in the scheme (i.e. making trade-offs between attributes of 
scheme participation and compensation requirements). In this case (all are rational profit 
maximisers), serial non-participation would typically represent “very high taking”. The only 
exception is the potential for strategic behaviour by some land managers, provided that they 
perceive that their responses will inﬂuence agency decisions (i.e. if the respondents perceive 
the survey as consequential, as highlighted by Carson and Groves, 2007). However, not all land 
managers may be entirely driven by profit maximization.  Non-profit-based motives (which can 
reflect self-interest or not) can have an important impact on a land manager’s decision making 
(e.g. Gasson, 1973; Burton, 2004; Barnes et al., 2011). Social interest and stewardship motives 
can affect the evaluation of a scheme’s benefits (Chouinard et al., 2008). If a proposed 
scheme’s benefits and its institutional design are in conflict with beliefs and values, land 
managers may not participate regardless of the compensation amount offered. For example, 
land managers who value independent decision making may oppose to being constrained to a 
narrowly defined set of management prescriptions regardless of the incentive (Kuhfuss et al., 
2015) and potential efficiency gains in production.  
These considerations imply that a serial non-participant can either be a VHT or a 
protester depending on the reasons for non-participation. In practice, the boundaries between 
protesters and VHT will be blurred. However, it is still possible to distinguish between motives 
for non-participation that are more likely to be either related to protest behaviour or to being 
a VHT. This would then offer a possibility to deal with both reasons for serial non-participation 
in the analysis. 
Protesters are typically considered to be outside the market and should thus be omitted 
from the analysis used to derive WTA estimates. Because their inclusion may bias WTA 
estimates, it is important to report their incidence and how they have been identified. This 
equally applies to VHT, whose treatment prior to analysis is less clear, since their 
compensation threshold for participation is greater than the greatest amount offered in the 
payment vector. VHT are therefore not willing to make trade-offs within the constraints of the 
proposed schemes. One may argue that they should be retained in the sample because their 
choices reflect their true preferences. Moreover, inclusion of VHT may have a significant effect 
on estimates of mean total WTA since their preferences are mostly captured through the ASC. 
However, it may equally be argued that it is not appropriate to assume that VHT hold the same 
preferences as participants over the stated contract scheme attributes given that trade-offs 
over attributes (and thus the consequences) are not observed. In any case, as for protesters, 
the incidence of VHT should also be reported, which is something that many studies fail to do 
(both for protest responses and serial non-participation in general). This can be observed in 
Table S1.1 (see on-line Appendix S1), which provides a detailed and comprehensive overview 
of WTA studies in the context of incentive-based schemes focused on ES provision. Only 12 out 
of 54 studies listed report any information on protest responses, and just five of these provide 
a more detailed account on the identification, incidence and treatment of protest responses 
and serial non-participation.  
There is no consensus about the identification of protest responses amongst those 
studies which report it. Our focus is on discriminating protest responses from VHT, but the 
criteria for allocation to each group vary considerably between studies. They include, for 
example, dissent with the proposed scheme (e.g. “it has nothing to do with real farming”) 
(Christensen et al., 2011), lack of trust in institutions (Lienhoop and Brouwer, 2015), 
misunderstanding or lack of information (Broch and Vedel, 2012), and whether respondents 
state that they do not want to be constrained in their choice of farming practices irrespective 
of the level of payment (Kuhfuss et al., 2015). Barr and Mourato (2014) consider ‘irrational 
choice’ to be indicative of a protest response, but do not detail what constitutes an irrational 
choice. Other criteria for identifying protesters used in the reviewed literature may equally 
reflect responses of VHT. Such criteria include, for example, whether respondents find all the 
hypothesised alternatives unattractive at the level of monetary compensation offered (Layton 
and Siikamäki, 2009). All the WTA studies that report information on protest responses exclude 
them from further analysis (Table S1.1). All of them except Kuhfuss et al. (2015) use open-
ended questions to inquire on the reasons for serial non-participation, which is a common way 
of identifying protest responses in WTP approaches (Arrow et al., 1993; Bateman et al., 2002). 
Our literature review clearly suggests that the identification and treatment of protest 
responses deserves further attention, especially concerning supply-side environmental 
valuation studies using WTA formats. 
3. Method 
3.1. Random parameter logit (RPL) model in willingness to accept (WTA) space  
Using CE data on farmers’ participation in an AES, we investigate the effect of inclusion or 
omission of serial non-participants, i.e. protesters and VHT, on WTA for participating in 
schemes aimed at enhancing the provision of ES. To do so, we compare WTA estimates derived 
from three different samples: (i) the whole sample (Total); (ii) the sample excluding protesters 
(No_protest); and (iii) the sample excluding protesters and VHT (Participants). For analysing the 
repeated choices between two alternatives of a scheme and a non-participation alternative 
(‘status quo’), random parameter logit models (RPL) with an additional error component in 
WTA space are used. The modelling approach is based on random utility theory, with a utility 
function U for farmer n and alternative i in choice task t: 
𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑡  =  𝛼𝑛
′𝑝𝑛𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽𝑛′𝑥𝑛𝑖𝑡 +  𝜗𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑛𝑖𝑡     [1] 
where p and x are monetary and non-monetary attributes of the experimental design, α and β 
are parameters to be estimated, and ε is the random error term, which is assumed to be 
identically and independently distributed (iid) and related to the choice probability with a 
Gumbel distributed error term. To account for the fact that respondents may treat the 
hypothetical AES alternatives (A, B) as being systematically different to the status quo (Scarpa 
et al., 2005), an additional error component ϑnit (distributed with N(0,σ
2
)) was included in the 
utility function, capturing the error variance shared by both A and B. 
In RPL models, heterogeneity across respondents is introduced by allowing αn and βn to 
deviate from the population means following a random distribution. The unconditional choice 
probability of respondent n’s sequence of choices (yn over Tn choice tasks) is:  
Pr(𝑦𝑛|𝛼𝑛, 𝛽𝑛, 𝜗) =  ∬ ∏
exp (𝛼𝑛
′ 𝑝𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑛
′ 𝑥𝑛𝑖𝑡)
∑ exp (𝛼𝑛′ 𝑝𝑛𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽𝑛′ 𝑥𝑛𝑗𝑡)
𝐽
𝑗=1
𝑓(𝜂𝑛𝑖|𝛺)𝜙(𝜗|0, 𝜎
2)𝑑𝜂𝑛𝑖𝑑𝜗
𝑇𝑛
𝑡1=1
 [2] 
where f(ηni|Ω) is the joint density of parameter vector for monetary and K non-monetary 
attributes [αn, βn1, βn2, … , βnK], ηni is the vector comprised of the random parameters and Ω 
denotes the parameters (namely the mean and variance) of these distributions. ϕ (∙) the 
normal density function for the error component. This integral does not have a closed form 
and thus requires approximation through simulation (Train, 2003). Our simulations are based 
on 1,000 draws using Modified Latin Hypercube Sampling. 
All choice models are estimated in WTA space (Train and Weeks, 2005), which allows 
the distributions of WTA to be estimated directly and hence avoids issues with calculating WTA 
as the ratio of two random distributions. The parameters of monetary and non-monetary 
attributes are assumed to follow lognormal and normal distributions, respectively. An 
alternative specific constant specified for the status quo alternative (ASCSQ, assumed to follow 
a normal distribution) was also included in the model, representing observed utility not 
captured by the attributes. 
We use the complete combinatorial test suggested by Poe et al. (2005) to test for 
differences in WTA estimates between the three samples (Total; No_protest; Participants). 
Total WTA for participation in alternative variants of an AES is estimated following Hanemann 
(1984). Total WTA therefore provides important information on the average compensation 
requirements for participation depending on scheme characteristics. The ASCSQ was included in 
these estimates, because it captures the utility difference between not participating in the 
scheme and entering a contract at baseline attribute levels for dummy coded categorical 
attributes and status quo levels for continuously coded attributes. Importantly, the constant 
also captures the utility difference between zero compensation in case of non-participation 
and the lowest compensation level offered in the contract alternatives. The sign of the ASCSQ 
therefore also depends on whether or not the expected cost of scheme participation is –on 
average across the sample– outweighed by the benefits associated with the lowest level of 
compensation offered in the experiment. Compared to non-participation, farmers can either 
expect to be worse off by scheme participation at the lowest compensation amount (positive 
effect on ASCSQ) or already expect to benefit from participation even at the lowest amount on 
offer (negative effect on ASCSQ). Also, the inclusion of the ASCSQ is recommended if it can 
plausibly carry a behavioural interpretation (Adamowicz et al., 1998). In our context, there may 
be factors influencing the farmers’ decision to participate in AES over and above the scheme 
attributes. Such factors may reflect barriers to uptake (Falconer, 2000), including transaction 
costs (Pannell, 2008), but also positive attitudes towards participating in AES, for example 
because farmers perceive AES as financially rewarding, as highlighted by Hynes and Garvey 
(2009). 
3.2. Sample selection bivariate probit model 
Following the identification of Protesters and VHT (see below), we model the decision process 
as a sequence of two decisions, using a sample selection bivariate probit model (Greene, 
2003). First, farmers decide whether to protest against the valuation exercise (Y1=0) or not 
(Y1=1). Then, those respondents not protesting further decide whether to participate in the 
AES on offer (Y2=1, which includes all the farmers who chose to participate at least in one 
choice situation, thus representing Participants) or not (Y2=0, which includes all the non-
protesting farmers who always chose the status quo alternative, thus representing VHT). We 
use the bivariate model, because we expect that the residuals of the expression explaining the 
dependent variables (Y1 and Y2) will be correlated.  
 
 
4. Data 
Our data come from a CE survey of olive farmers in Andalusia, Spain. Olive trees are the main 
crop grown in the region, covering more than 1.5 million hectares or 48% of the farmland. 
Olive grove systems have a great potential for improvement in the provision of environmental 
public goods. According to Villanueva et al. (2014), biodiversity, soil fertility, mitigation of 
climate change, and visual quality of the landscape are the four public goods with the greatest 
enhancement potential. However, both previous and current AES target only a few specific 
olive grove areas within the region. This motivated our investigation of the implementation of 
AES aimed at increasing the provision of public goods from a wide range of olives groves in the 
region. 
4.1. Attributes 
Six attributes were used in the CE. Three attributes were linked to agricultural management 
aimed at improving environmental public good provision (biodiversity, soil conservation, 
carbon sequestration, and landscape amenity) (Barranco et al., 2008; Stoate et al., 2009; 
Villanueva et al., 2014), two attributes to policy design and a final attribute specifies the level 
of compensation payments. 
Two of the agricultural management attributes focus on soil management, in particular 
on the area covered by cover crops and the management of that area. The two levels of the 
attribute Cover crop area (CCAR) of 25% and 50% of the olive grove area (CCAR-25% and CCAR-
50%) were set based on Gómez-Limón and Arriaza (2011) and expert knowledge. Cover crop 
management (CCMA) has two levels: unconstrained (CCMA-Free) and constrained 
management (CCMA-Constr) with respect to tillage and herbicide use, with the latter being a 
condition in former AES available to olive growers. 
For the attribute Ecological focus areas (EFA), levels were set at zero and 2% of the olive 
grove plots covered by EFA (EFA-0% and EFA-2%). The first level is equivalent to the current 
requirement for receiving single farm payments for permanent crops. Considering the current 
lack of land qualifying as EFA in Andalusian olive groves and the difficulties of increasing the 
share of EFA in permanent crops (Gómez-Limón and Arriaza, 2011), the second level was set to 
be lower than the 5% of EFA to be provided by arable farms as part of the greening component 
of single farm payments in the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). 
Collective participation (COLLE) and monitoring (MONI) are the two scheme design 
attributes included in the CE. Collective contracts represent a promising way of reducing 
transaction costs (mainly public) while increasing the environmental effectiveness of policy 
instruments (Uthes and Matzdorf, 2013). Participation in the scheme was offered either as a 
collective or as an individual. For participation to be considered collective, a group of at least 
five farmers whose farms are located in the same municipality have to sign the same AES 
contract. With regards to MONI, previous literature shows that the level of monitoring 
influences farmers’ preferences towards AES (e.g. Broch and Vedel, 2012). The two levels set 
for MONI are 5% and 20% of olive grove farms monitored (MONI-5% and MONI-20%, 
respectively) over the contract length of 5 years. 5% is the typical monitoring level of CAP 
measures, while the higher level represents a considerable increase over current practice. 
Finally, with regard to the payment attribute (PAYM), four levels were established 
according to payments in a previous AES (Sub-Measure 7) available to olive growers (€204-
286/ha per year). Two levels (€200/ha and €300/ha) were set in line with these payments, 
while two further levels (€100/ha and €400/ha) were set as minimum and maximum 
payments. 
4.2. Experimental design and data collection 
A fractional factorial design that is optimal in the differences (Street and Burgess, 2007) was 
used to create a manageable number of choice sets, reducing from all possible combinations 
(1924) to 192 profiles (D-efficiency=91.3%). The 192 choice sets were divided into 24 blocks of 
eight choice sets each. Each farmer answered one block. In each choice set, farmers were 
asked to choose between two alternatives of AES and a status quo alternative, representing 
non-participation. Figure 1 shows an example of a typical choice set. 
Figure 1 about here 
A multi-stage sampling procedure was employed. In the first stage, five agricultural 
districts2 in Andalusia were selected as primary sampling units from a total of 52. The sampled 
districts account for 31.0% of Andalusian olive groves. In the next stage, 10 villages/towns 
located in each of the sampled districts were selected as secondary sampling units using a 
random route procedure. Finally, in each village 6-8 face-to-face interviews were conducted 
intercepting farmers in various public places and various times of the day3. The interviews 
were carried out between October 2013 and January 2014. Of a total of 330 interviews, 327 
complete responses were obtained. In terms of key farm characteristics such as average yield 
and farmers’ age, level of education and farm-labour time, the sample mirrors farm 
characteristics obtained in a previous benchmarking survey of Gómez-Limón and Arriaza 
(2011), who used the same farm conceptualization4. With respect to size, large farms seem to 
                                                     
2
 Campiña Norte and La Loma (province of Jaen), La Sierra and Campiña Alta (province of Cordoba), and Norte (province of 
Malaga). 
3
 There is no register of farmers that would have allowed random sampling since the conceptualization of “olive grove farm” is 
different in our study compared to the official statistics (e.g. CAyP, 2008), as we consider farm as a single decision-making 
entity regardless of its legal personality. Farmers usually live in towns with their farms (and plots) being spread over nearby 
areas. 
4
 We ran t-tests (χ
2
 for dichotomous variables) to compare our sample characteristics to those of that survey. 
be slightly overrepresented relative to the benchmarking survey, although this may be 
explained by the on-going structural change in the region5.  
Amongst the respondents, serial non-participants were carefully scrutinised in order to 
distinguish protesters from VHT based on an analysis of an open-ended question on the 
reasons for serial non-participation. Serial non-participants who stated protest reasons were 
considered to be protesters, while the remaining participants were considered to be VHT. We 
did not collect information on perceived consequentiality; however, the interviewers did not 
detect strategic behaviour that would indicate a lack of consequentiality. 
5. Results 
5.1. Identification of protest responses 
Of the total of 327 complete responses used for analysis, 67 were serial non-participants 
(20.5% of the total sample); that is, they chose the status quo alternative in all eight choice 
situations. Table 1 summarises the reasons given by serial non-participants for not enrolling in 
the AES. The majority of the respondents (59 out of 67) stated a single reason. Of these 
respondents, 32 gave a reason related to opposition to the attributes, thus they were classified 
as VHT. These respondents stated reasons such as rejecting adoption of cover crops (attribute 
CCAR), non-attractiveness of the monetary incentive offered (attribute PAYM), and not 
wanting to be monitored (attribute MONI)6. Because all of the proposed AES alternatives 
included the use of cover crops (at 25% or at 50%), cover crops adoption can represent a 
hurdle for AES participation. The choices of the farmers who generally rejected the use of 
cover crops therefore clearly reflect discontinuous preferences. Additionally, there were seven 
respondents who stated protest reasons other than opposition to the attributes, and are thus 
considered to be protesters.  
The protest-related reasons mainly indicated negative attitudes towards the AES 
offered and, to a lesser extent, no reason/no response. In particular, many respondents 
generally rejected the idea of a multi-annual payment conditional on implementing additional 
management measures (N=17). The specific reasons included considering AES to be 
unnecessary and a nuisance, mostly related to simply opposing to the objective of the scheme 
                                                     
5
 The sampling method may have led to a slight overrepresentation of large farms. However, this is unlikely to explain the 
differences between the two surveys as both used a very similar sampling method. 
6
 The specific reasons listed here result from qualitative information gathered by the interviewers. 
of provision of environmental goods (as underscored by Christensen et al., 2011), but also 
complaints about the level of bureaucracy involved (N=3), and lack of trust in the public 
institutions administering AES (N=1) (mirroring the protest explanation of Lienhoop and 
Brouwer, 2015). Twelve respondents did not consider participation in AES to be an option for 
their small farms (consistent with Amigues et al., 2002), with seven of them stating other 
protest reason/s in addition to this. Two respondents expressed disapproval of any kind of 
subsidy, while nine respondents were not willing to provide reasons for serial non-
participation, or declined a response (falling within the category no reason/no response, which 
is indicative of protest response as suggested by Amigues et al. 2002, and Barr and Mourato 
2014). All of the above responses are of protest nature, because the interviewee is justifying 
his/her choices not on the basis of their preferences with regards to alternatives, attributes 
and levels presented in the choice tasks. All these reasons suggest that they were not willing to 
make trade-offs (Lusk et al., 2006) and hence state their true preferences towards the AES 
offered. 
Table 1 about here 
5.2. Results of willingness to accept models 
Table 2 shows the results of the RPL models in WTA space for the three samples: no serial non-
participants excluded (Total), protesters excluded (No_protest), and all serial non-participants 
excluded (Participants). The three models are highly signiﬁcant and goodness-of-fit indicators 
are favourable (pseudo-R2>0.43). All attribute parameters are highly significant (0.1% level or 
lower) and have the expected sign. The parameter of the constant (ASCSQ) is negative and 
significantly different from zero. If a behavioural interpretation was applied, farmers would 
waive some of the compensation associated with AES participation for reasons that are 
unconnected to the scheme’s specific attributes. However, it is also likely that the negative sign 
simply implies that, for a considerable number of the respondents, the expected benefits of 
scheme participation at the lowest compensation level (€100/ha) outweigh expected cost of 
participation. The ‘error component’ is significant in each sample and decreases in magnitude 
when removing serial non-participants. This indicates that the error component is efficient in 
capturing the ‘status quo effect’ induced by serial non-participation (Scarpa et al., 2005). 
Results of models without the error component (not reported here, but available on request) 
confirm this finding.  
Table 2 about here 
The resulting mean marginal WTA estimates are shown in Table 3, which also highlights 
significant differences between the samples. The exclusion of protesters and VHT has a 
significant effect on marginal WTA estimates for three out of the five attributes: CCAR, EFA and 
COLLE. However, there is no clear directional trend in differences between the three samples. 
We also report WTA equivalents related to the ASCSQ estimates, with Total and No_protest 
samples showing significantly higher values (€-69.3/ha and €-80.0/ha, respectively) than the 
Participants sample (€-124.0/ha), suggesting that consideration of serial non-participation may 
have a large effect on total WTA estimates.  
Table 3 about here 
This is confirmed by the results of total WTA estimates for all possible combinations of 
attributes into AES alternatives reported in Table S2.1 (see Appendix S2). Total WTA varies 
remarkably depending on whether protesters and VHT are included in the sample or not. In 
particular, 31 out of the total of 32 AES alternatives show significant differences between the 
three samples (at 5% level). The highest estimate is always found for the Total sample, while 
the lowest estimate is always found for the Participants sample. In 24 and 17 out of the cases, 
removing those respondents identified as protesters (No_protest) results in significantly higher 
estimates compared to Total and significantly lower estimates compared to Participants, 
respectively. On average across all 32 AES alternatives, total WTA is €280.3/ha for Total, 
€250.0/ha for No_protest, and €222.3/ha for Participants. The order of magnitude of the 
estimates is in line with AES previously and currently implemented in olive growing in the 
region. A good example is scenario SC2, whose attribute levels correspond to the currently 
implemented AES. AES payments are €145.3-174.7/ha, set based on government’s estimates of 
the olive growers’ income forgone (Junta de Andalucía, 2015), which is very much on par with 
€165.1/ha of total WTA estimated for SC2 if protesters are excluded.  
While we have no data to estimate the actual opportunity costs of surveyed farmers, 
we calculated an approximate average value of €230/ha based on cost and productivity 
information reported for the olive sector in the region7 for the most stringent AES with 
individual participation (scenario SC16). This is lower than the estimate of total WTA 
                                                     
7
 We therefore estimated average opportunity costs based on Rodríguez-Lizana et al. (2007) and Gómez-Limón and Arriaza 
(2011), assuming transaction costs of 20%. Collecting reliable information on actual opportunity costs in the survey was not 
practicable. Therefore, this estimate should be treated with caution. 
(€396.8/ha, estimated if protesters are excluded) for that scenario. Various reasons can 
account for the difference. For example, transaction costs may be higher than assumed (20% 
of costs of implementation and income forgone) for estimating average opportunity costs. It is 
also possible that non-profit-based motives are playing a large role for participation in AES. In 
addition, some respondents may have over-stated their compensation requirements in the 
choice experiment, although we have no evidence that farmers acted strategically.  
5.3. Results of the sample selection bivariate probit model 
The results of the sample selection bivariate probit model are shown in the Table 4. Because 
the rho coefficient is significant, residuals of the expressions explaining the two dependent 
variables are correlated. This suggests that the bivariate probit model is preferred over two 
separate probit models. The results of coefficients for covariates show that farm and farmer 
characteristics influence the likelihood of obtaining protest and VHT responses. In particular, 
farm size and farmers’ age seem to be related to both types of responses. Small farms (less 
than 15 ha) and older farmers have a higher likelihood of both types of serial non-participation. 
With regards to protest responses, the type of olive grove, farmer’s level of education, and 
her/his knowledge of AES currently implemented are also relevant determinants. Farmers 
without primary school education have a lower likelihood of acting according to their 
preferences in the valuation exercise (i.e. a higher likelihood of a protest response), while 
knowledge on current AES implemented or if the farm’s main type is mountain olive groves is 
associated with a lower likelihood of showing protest responses. With regards to VHT 
responses, farm characteristics specifically related to the AES on offer and the attributes and 
levels included in it seem to determine farmer’s decision on whether to participate or not (i.e. 
to be a participant or a VHT, respectively). Those farmers who comply with having 25% cover 
crops in line with attribute level CCAR 25%, and those who perceive the use of cover crops as 
economically beneficial, have a higher likelihood of participating (lower likelihood of being a 
VHT). The significant coefficients for the constants imply that there is unobserved 
heterogeneity which affects the decision of whether to protest or not (dependent variable Y1), 
and whether to participate or not (dependent variable Y2). 
Table 4 about here 
This analysis is complemented with our on-line Appendix S3, which provides a comprehensive 
summary of the characteristics of the three groups of farmers (Protesters, Very high takers, 
and Participants), and reports the differences between the groups. Apart from those 
characteristics included in the bivariate probit model (Table 4), some characteristics are 
common to Protesters and VHT (more frequent use of conventional techniques, greater share 
of family labour, lower professional training), while others appear to be group specific. In 
particular, very high takers have less cover crop area, and perceive economic benefits from the 
use of cover crops and environmental benefits from EFA to be lower. Interestingly, fewer 
protesters claim membership to farmer unions, while they spend a lower share of their labour 
time on the farm.  
These findings show that protesters and VHT clearly differ from participants in that they 
show characteristics that have previously been found to negatively affect AES uptake (Siebert 
et al., 2006; Uthes and Matzdorf, 2013). This includes farm and farmer characteristics, 
especially smaller farm size and older farmers, but also other characteristics (e.g. greater share 
of family labour, more frequent use of conventional techniques, greater additional effort 
implied by participation based on farmers’ status quo). The differences between Protesters 
and VHT (especially regarding the use and perception of agri-environmental management 
practices) are in line with concerns about cover crops and EFA attributes raised by VHT when 
stating reasons for serial non-participation, as opposed to protesters, who objected to AES 
participation for reasons unrelated to the scheme specification. 
6. Discussion 
6.1. Identifying protest responses 
Three general categories typically relate to protest responses in stated preference studies: i) 
respondents’ attitudes towards the good at hand (e.g. dislike of the good under study, 
information inquiry); ii) the non-acceptance of the valuation approach (mainly critique of the 
method including objections to the payment vehicle, and fairness and ethical concerns); and iii) 
no reason/no response (Halstead et al., 1992; Jorgensen et al., 1999; Groothuis and 
Whitehead, 2002; Bateman et al., 2002; Meyerhoff and Liebe, 2006; Dziegielewska and 
Mendelsohn, 2007; Brouwer and Martín-Ortega, 2012). Protesters in our case study fall 
primarily in the category of respondents’ attitude to the good at hand and no reason/no 
response. The absence of protest beliefs related to non-acceptance of the valuation approach 
may reflect the fact that Andalusian olive growers (as many other EU farmers) are used to 
choosing among different types of policy schemes. Similar to Christensen et al. (2011) we 
particularly find respondents showing disapproval to the type and objective of the scheme 
offered. This may not reflect rational utility maximising behaviour (especially concerning 
profits) as assumed in choice experiments as respondents categorically deny making trade-offs 
between costs and benefits of scheme participation due to negative attitudes towards the 
schemes. Responses falling into the category of no reason/no response are difficult to 
interpret. No response/no reason may reflect either disinterest or lack of understanding, but 
we did not collect information to document the motives behind this category. 
6.2. Impact of protest responses on willingness to accept estimates 
Our results clearly suggest that the inclusion/exclusion of serial non-participants (protesters 
and VHT) in the analysis strongly impacts WTA estimates. Three out of five attributes show 
significant differences in WTA. In terms of absolute magnitude, however, differences are most 
pronounced for estimates of total WTA, which are of particular relevance for understanding 
compensation requirements for participation in incentive-based schemes. Our results 
therefore suggest that protest responses should be identified and subsequently removed from 
further analysis, as with WTP studies (Barrio and Loureiro, 2013). Identification of protesters 
implies distinguishing them from VHT respondents. Excluding VHT in addition to protesters can 
result in significantly lower WTA estimates, which is clearly undesirable given that their 
compensation requirements are actually greater than the highest compensation level offered. 
6.3. Handling protest responses when analysing environmental providers’ preferences 
towards incentive-based schemes 
Since the impact of serial non-participation (either related to protesters or VHT) can be 
substantial, researchers should ideally attempt to avoid its occurrence ex ante. Therefore, we 
discuss some potential ex ante measures.  
First, the design of the non-monetary attribute can affect the share of protest response 
and VHT. For example, many farmers in our analysis perceived constraints in how to manage 
cover crops to be very restrictive. While this is reflected by a high WTA for schemes that 
include such attribute levels, it can also increase the incidence of protest responses. This is the 
case if farmers are generally opposed to governments’ proposed incentive-based schemes that 
contain unacceptable elements. Since perceptions of unnecessarily restrictive or unacceptable 
conditions depend on context, it is important to fully understand the proposed changes. If 
deviations of proposed changes from the status quo are substantial for some farmers, they 
may well protest that the proposed scheme is unrealistic. It follows that the ‘lowest’ attribute 
levels should be set to represent small to moderate changes relative to the status quo.  
As in WTP formats, the design of the monetary attribute is particularly important. 
Although to our knowledge the sensitivity of WTA estimates to the design of the payment 
vector has not yet been systematically investigated in a similar fashion as in WTP formats (e.g. 
Hanley et al., 2005; Carlsson and Martinsson, 2008; Mørkbak et al., 2010), the range of 
compensation levels are very likely to have an effect on WTA estimates and serial-non-
participation. The choice of lowest and highest amounts of compensation offered could well be 
critical. The lowest and highest compensation amounts need to be set to capture the greatest 
part of the potential ES supply. If the lowest compensation amount offered is not rejected by 
most of the respondents, the utility associated with accepting less than the lowest amount 
offered will be captured by the ASC, and the coefficient of the monetary attribute and thus 
WTA estimates may be biased. The choice of the lowest compensation amount offered may 
also be related to range bias (Bateman et al., 2002), which would occur if ES providers’ WTA is 
lower than the lowest compensation amount offered and imply that their stated WTA is 
greater than their true minimum WTA. The highest compensation amount offered may be 
chosen to be sufficiently high to allow providers with high compensation requirements to 
participate in the scheme. This would potentially reduce the incidence of serial-non-
participation by VHT. However, because the upper boundary of WTA is not constrained and 
little is known about the thresholds levels of compensation required by VHT, there are trade-
offs between increasing the magnitude of the highest level of the monetary attribute and 
associated undesirable effects, especially inducing strategic response behaviour. High 
compensation levels may signal to ES providers that the budget available for the scheme is 
substantial and they may thus be inclined to ‘overstate’ their WTA (especially if they consider 
their responses to be consequential). In addition, very high compensation amounts offered 
may also cast doubt on the credibility of the proposed schemes. Pivoting the compensation 
levels around a maximum compensation requirement for participation in schemes similar to 
the one on offer may offer a way forward. Further research is needed on the design of the 
monetary attribute in this type of WTA studies. Apart from the levels of payments, researchers 
should provide deeper insights on how the design of the payment vehicle (for example, 
contract length, frequency and timing of payments, conditionality of payments depending on 
others’ participation and/or compliance) affect ES providers’ WTA. In addition, the effect of 
individuals’ perceived consequentiality of the survey on WTA estimates needs further 
investigation. 
 Our guidelines for discriminating between protest responses and VHT have been useful, 
and may prove helpful in other WTA contexts as well (e.g. farm decision-making (Hudson and 
Lusk, 2004; Windle and Rolfe, 2005)). We recommend the inclusion of follow-up questions to 
elicit the reasons behind serial non-participation to allow ex post identification of protest 
respondents. However, while closed-ended questions can assist in a more standardised, 
systematic identification, they can also suggest protest beliefs to respondents that they would 
otherwise not have considered. To avoid such framing effects, open-ended debriefing 
questions, followed by a clarification through the interviewer (in face-to-face surveys) using a 
pre-defined list of reasons for serial non-participation may be preferable. In mail or online 
surveys, a single-response closed-ended question could ask the respondent to choose the 
option that best represents her/his beliefs from a list of VHT and protest beliefs (or to rank 
them), perhaps using the reasons advanced in our study as a benchmark. More systematic 
analysis of protest attitudes and motives, for example along the line of Meyerhoff and Liebe 
(2006) in the context of WTP, would be clearly desirable for WTA studies. 
7. Conclusions 
The problem of protest responses in stated preference surveys remains contested in the 
environmental valuation literature, both on the demand side and the supply side. To our 
knowledge, this is the first study that provides a comprehensive survey and analysis concerning 
the identification and treatment of protest responses for supply side assessments. Focusing on 
an increasing number of choice experiments aimed at estimating environmental service 
providers’ WTA to participate in incentive-based schemes, we demonstrate the relevance of 
considering serial non-participation and especially protest responses. Based on our empirical 
findings, we recommend routinely identifying protest responses and subsequently excluding 
them from analysis used to derive WTA estimates. Additionally, protest responses must be 
distinguished from serial non-participation by ‘very high takers’, that is, respondents who 
require high compensation amounts in return for scheme participation. In contrast to protest 
respondents, very high takers reveal their true preferences by opting for non-participation in 
all choice situations, so they should be included in the analysis of WTA. We propose a general 
framework to distinguish between protesters and very high takers, but further research is 
needed on the reasons for protest responses. 
If protest responses are not identified, and consequently included in the analysis, 
researchers risk deriving biased estimates of ES providers’ minimum compensation 
requirements. This can result in inappropriate budget allocation for the implementation of the 
related incentive-based schemes, ultimately also affecting ES provision. In some previous 
studies very high takers were also excluded from the analysis. Our results show that this may 
also provide erroneous signals to policy makers, because implementation budgets may be set 
too low.  
We strongly recommend that researchers include follow-up questions to elicit the 
reasons behind serial non-participation in order to allow ex post identification of protest 
respondents. We report several beliefs stated by ES providers that are likely reflecting protest 
responses that can be adjusted to different study contexts and samples. Because options to 
deal with serial non-participation ex post are limited, we recommend developing ex ante 
measures in the research design to mitigate serial non-participation especially by reducing the 
amount of very high takers. In this respect, a better understanding of the role of the design of 
scheme attributes is needed. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1 
Reasons for serial non-participation 
Reasons Protesters 
Very high 
takers (VHT) 
Serial non-
participants 
Non-protest reasons    
Opposition to attributes 7 32 39 
Protest reasons     
Rejecting the idea of a complementary 
environmental subsidy 
17 – 17 
Too much bureaucracy 3 – 3 
Lack of trust in public institutions 1 – 1 
AES not an option (small farms) 12 – 12 
Disapproval of any kind of subsidy 2 – 2 
No reason given 1 – 1 
Response declined 8 – 8 
One reason given 27 32 59 
Two or more reasons given 8 – 8 
Total 35 32 67 
 
  
Table 2 
Random Parameter Logit model in WTA-space 
  Total No_Protest Participants 
 
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. 
Mean             
CCAR (1% of CCAR) 0.078 0.002 0.067 0.002 0.073 0.004 
CCMA (CCMA-Constr=1) 1.800 0.050 1.770 0.077 1.830 0.107 
EFA (1% of EFA) 0.760 0.020 0.871 0.041 0.838 0.048 
COLLE (Collective part.=1) 1.230 0.050 1.150 0.075 1.440 0.100 
MONI (1% of farms monitored) 0.014 0.002 0.013 0.003 0.018 0.005 
PAYM 1.120 0.120 1.440 0.174 0.975 0.154 
ASCSQ -0.693 0.085 -0.800 0.104 -1.240 0.169 
Standard deviation of random parameters        
CCAR 0.112 0.003 0.110 0.004 0.094 0.006 
CCMA 2.040 0.044 2.150 0.081 2.000 0.098 
EFA 0.785 0.014 0.931 0.029 0.944 0.062 
COLLE 1.910 0.062 1.640 0.064 1.710 0.190 
MONI 0.025 0.003 0.010 0.003 0.016 0.005 
PAYM 1.610 0.126 1.560 0.185 1.190 0.157 
ASCSQ 0.891 0.057 0.704 0.028 1.050 0.070 
Error component 6.490 0.905 3.480 0.450 1.780 0.374 
Log-likelihood (LL) -1460.3 
 
-1382.0 
 
-1307.8 
 McFadden Pseudo-R2 0.492   0.462   0.428   
Observations 327   292   260   
Note: All the parameters and std. dev. are different from zero at 0.1% significance level. The monetary 
attribute has been scaled (100:1) and the sign has been changed to directly yield positive values that 
reflect farmers’ WTA for a change in the attributes. 
  
Table 3 
Mean marginal willingness to accept (WTA) in €/ha 
Attributes Total No_Protest Participants 
Statistical differences 
Total-
No_Protest 
Total-
Participants 
No_Protest-
Participants 
Cover crops area  
(1% of CCAR) 
7.8 6.7 7.3 ***   
(7.4/8.2) (6.3/7.1) (6.5/8.1)    
Cover crops management 
(CCMA-Constr=1) 
180.0 177.0 183.0    
(170.1/189.9) (161.6/192.4) (161.6/204.4)    
Ecological focus areas  
(1% of EFA) 
76.0 87.1 83.8 **   
(72.0/80.0) (79.0/95.2) (74.2/93.4)    
Collective participation 
(COLLE=1) 
123.0 115.0 144.0  * ** 
(113.0/133.0) (100.0/130.0) (124.0/164.0)    
Monitoring  
(1% of farms monitored) 
1.4 1.3 1.8    
(0.9/1.9) (0.8/1.8) (0.9/2.7)    
ASCSQ -69.3 -80.0 -124.0  ** * 
(-86.3/-52.3) (-100.8/-59.2) (-157.8/-90.2)    
Note: All WTA estimates are different from zero at the 0.1% significance level. 
*
, 
**
, and 
***
 reflect statistical 
differences at 5%, 1%, and 0.1% levels respectively –resulting from the Poe et al. (2005) test. 
  
Table 4 
Sample Selection Bivariate Probit model to explain protest, very high takers and participants’ 
decisions 
Decision Variable [acronym] Coef. 
 
S.E. 
Y1 Constant 2.725 *** 0.634 
 
Olive tree area below 15 ha [Oliarea15] -0.545 ** 0.253 
 
Farmer's age [Age] -0.023 ** 0.011 
 
Farmer did not go to school [Noeduca] -0.700 ** 0.275 
 
Farmer knows current AES implemented [KnowAES] 0.590 * 0.305 
 
Main type of olive groves in the farm: Mountain olive groves [SysMOG] 0.694 ** 0.338 
Y2 Constant 1.485 *** 0.560 
 
Olive tree area below 15 ha [Oliarea15] -0.638 ** 0.311 
 
Farmer age [Age] -0.017 * 0.010 
 
Farmers complies with CCAR-25% [CoCCAR25%] 0.664 ** 0.299 
 
Perception of cover crops as economically beneficial [PCCbenef] 0.343 *** 0.083 
Rho 
 
-0.994 *** 0.059 
Log-likelihood function=-159.82; Observations: 324. 
 
Note:
 
Decisions: Y1 (0/1), Protest/Non protest; if Y1=1, Y2, Participation/Non participation (i.e. VHT) (1/0). All 
variables are dichotomous except PCCbenef, which is an ordinal scaled Likert scale variable (5 representing 
“Absolutely agree” with the statement that cover crops are economically beneficial for the farm in the long 
term), and Age (years). 
*
, 
**
, and 
***
 reflect significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
  
Figures 
Figure 1 
Example of a typical choice set 
 
